From the “Chat Control” project to the “Democratic Shield” and its “European Centre for Democratic Resilience,” and through to the “Media Freedom Act,” the EU is weaving a web of control over expression and public freedoms. A worrying evolution with deep roots, as MEP Virginie Joron reminds us. Analysis.

“I say it clearly: there is a will to control our democracies!” declares Virginie Joron, MEP with the Patriots for Europe group, in an interview with INCYBER.
Is the European Union drifting into authoritarianism? The question is legitimate in light of the literally Orwellian regulations it has recently adopted — Orwellian both in substance (restrictions on civil liberties and fundamental rights) and in form (these texts always claim to defend children, democracy, or vaguely defined “European values”).

Thus, on September 10, in a rather indifferent atmosphere, Ursula von der Leyen announced — in her now traditional State of the Union address — the creation of a “European Centre for Democratic Resilience.” “We must have additional capacities to monitor and detect information manipulation and disinformation,” the Commission President told the European Parliament.

A member of the Budgetary Control Committee and the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, Virginie Joron recalls the genesis of this project, which follows from the “European Democratic Shield.”
“I’m a member of this special EUDS committee, which is supposed to make recommendations to the Commission regarding ‘hybrid attacks’ and ‘interference’ in our democracies. To support the implementation of this new competence of the Commission — namely, to control democracies — Mrs. von der Leyen announced the creation of this European Centre for Democratic Resilience, which will bring together the expertise and resources of member states and neighboring partners.”

Combating “anti-elitism and viral anti-institutional discourse”

“It’s part of a long-standing tradition of narrative control by the European Commission,” Joron continues, “notably through its funding and support of certain NGOs and media outlets. I refer you to the 1996 article in Le Monde diplomatique about the press center funded and fed by the Commission to sell the EU’s federalist project. Think also of the network of NGOs with opaque funding that support the pro-European narrative, recently exposed in the ‘green NGOs’ scandal — financed by the Commission to promote the Green Deal among MEPs.”

What could this “European Centre for Democratic Resilience” actually entail? The initiative was suggested by NATO to its allies in 2022 and should take inspiration from the guidelines of the European Centre for Strategic Security (CESS). This center boasts of massively collecting and analyzing online content to “monitor artificially amplified distrust: conspiracy theories, anti-elitism, viral anti-institutional discourse.” Detecting “electoral manipulation attempts,” centralizing alerts on “disinformation” and “systemic threats” targeted by the Digital Services Act (DSA), and strengthening cooperation with fact-checkers are also on its agenda.

“In the DSA itself,” Joron notes, “there’s a hidden clause — Article 34, paragraph C — about protecting ‘electoral processes.’ Two key words that the Commission is now abusing. The clause states that platforms must monitor all ‘systemic risks,’ including those affecting electoral processes — without defining them.”

“Losing ground, they want to control political speech”

“In practice,” she explains, “the Commission summons the national authorities designated under the DSA — in France, that’s ARCOM — before, during, and after elections to report on ‘systemic risks.’” “From those two words stems Mrs. Loiseau’s special committee on the ‘Democratic Shield,’ because they believe the rise of patriotic parties, which rely heavily on social media, is a threat to democracy,” says the MEP from the EUDS committee.

After three years in force, the DSA is set for review in mid-November. Could it become even stricter? It’s too early to tell. “We can already see pressure from certain parliamentarians — the socialists and Macronists in particular. As they lose ground, they want to control political speech,” warns Joron.

Convincing Europeans to accept such tutelage over democratic processes remains a challenge. Conveniently, just before the State of the Union address, MEPs received a report on combating “autocratic discourse” — which infuriates Joron: “I see you’re well informed! To justify this new Centre for Democratic Resilience, they’re selling it as protection against ‘hybrid attacks,’ ‘foreign interference,’ and now even against parties with ‘autocratic discourse.’ The report even proposes a new definition of autocracy. For example, criticizing wokism, mentioning security or immigration issues would be deemed ‘autocratic.’ Communicating directly with citizens via social media would also be seen as an attack on democracy.” Could such parties eventually be barred from running for election?

Spying on and arresting journalists — it’s possible!

The Romanian case is revealing. Both official and journalistic investigations found no evidence of foreign interference — yet this was used as a pretext to eliminate populist candidate Calin Georgescu. The same narrative about fake Russian TikTok accounts is now circulating in the Czech Republic, though its veracity is unclear. “What I told them in committee,” Joron says, “is that they claim to defend democracy and fight autocracy — but they are the autocrats.”

Another pillar of the European Commission’s narrative: “protecting our media and independent press,” through increased funding… “More funding means more dependence!” exclaims Joron. “Remember the scandal of EU-funded media created to sell the European narrative!”

Independent media already face heavy pressure from the EU — through the DSA, which encourages pre-emptive “moderation” of nonconforming content, and through the “Media Freedom Act,” which entered into force last May.

This regulation gives EU authorities sweeping powers over journalists: it allows surveillance via spyware in cases of “overriding public interest.” Such surveillance must be legally authorized and approved in advance (or afterward in urgent cases) by a judicial or “independent” authority (such as ARCOM). It also allows, under similar vague criteria, the arrest of journalists and the forced disclosure of their sources.

Identity verification, “just like in China”

“They’re setting up a European committee that will decide which journalists are ‘independent,’ with the help of certain NGOs,” explains Joron. “This committee, led by the Commission, will oversee implementation of the law, track ‘disinformation’ and ‘terrorism and racism’ — terms open to all interpretations. In the EU’s view, ‘independent journalists’ are often those in opposition in countries deemed autocratic, like Hungary or Slovakia. In France, the control is more direct,” she adds, “through public subsidies and media ownership concentrated among pro-European oligarchs.”

That’s not all. Following the example of a controversial British law, the EU is seeking to impose age-verification for access not only to pornographic sites but also to social networks. The intention may be noble, but the outcome could be disastrous: the only way to implement such a measure would be to link every internet connection to an official ID (passport or national card) — “just like in China,” admits French MP Laure Miller, rapporteur of a parliamentary inquiry into TikTok’s psychological effects on minors. Goodbye to online anonymity, which protects vulnerable people and whistleblowers.

“Breaking with the mistaken idea that communication is a civil liberty”

“It’s a highly complex issue,” Joron concedes. “We must find a balance between innovation, freedom, and child protection. The DSA already addresses hate speech, harassment, and sexual abuse online. But should we fight harmful content — or fight social media addiction? These are separate issues, and addiction affects all ages. I’d rather approach it as a public health matter, not as mass surveillance.”

This mechanism could also help push forward the European digital identity — a unique identifier for social media, government services, and banking. Sound familiar? “Social credit,” perhaps.

The same pretext — protecting children — is used by the Commission to promote its “Chat Control” regulation: mass surveillance of online messaging, including encrypted services, to track pedocriminal content. WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram, Facebook, TikTok — all public and private channels would be affected.

In practice? A blatant violation of a fundamental human right: privacy and the secrecy of correspondence. This hasn’t troubled Peter Hummelgaard, Danish Minister of Justice and one of the architects of the CSAM (Child Sexual Abuse Material) project: “We must break with the totally mistaken idea that communicating on encrypted messaging services is a civil liberty.”

“The mass surveillance meat grinder”

“I’m surprised,” says Joron, “because the Danes usually see themselves as liberals. But that’s their position. The problem is, Denmark currently holds the EU presidency and has rewritten the text. Parliament had amended it to protect people’s privacy — we didn’t want everyone thrown into the mass surveillance meat grinder. But Denmark deleted those safeguards, which is what’s blocking the text now.”

“Why did they remove them? That’s the real question. Why lump everyone together?” she wonders.

“Chat Control” has been a recurring topic since 2022. It was scheduled for a Council vote on October 14 but was postponed due to opposition from nine member states — France not among them. A brief reprieve before “Big Mother is watching you”? “A qualified majority was needed but not reached, thanks to Germany,” says Joron. “But beware — Cyprus takes over the presidency in January, and it supports the text. Our group will fight to restore privacy protections. We must fight sexual abuse, but we must strictly limit data access — and avoid scanning all messaging apps, as Denmark wanted.”

Nothing to hide? It’s not you who decides

That was Joron’s stance when InCyber interviewed her. But on October 3, the official X account of Signal announced that Berlin may reverse its position — bringing “Chat Control” back to the Council’s agenda. That same day, Emmanuel Macron delivered a fiery speech in Saarbrücken targeting social media. “I hope it’s a false alarm,” Joron reacted on October 4. “If not, let’s hope for a turnaround from Hungary and Italy — their support for this text is incomprehensible, given their usual pro-freedom stance.”

Beyond its liberticidal nature, such mass surveillance contradicts the EU’s own rule-of-law principles. While it’s legitimate to monitor suspects under judicial authorization, it borders on totalitarianism to surveil the entire population. “We must keep public pressure high — citizens are writing to us every day,” she warns.

Experience shows that true criminals simply migrate to other systems — and that backdoors inevitably fall into hackers’ hands. Goodbye data security. And beware of false positives: send your mother a beach photo of your child, and you might be flagged as a pedophile.

The liberticidal drift remains the gravest concern. Think you have nothing to hide? Remember — you don’t decide what’s “reprehensible.” Once authorities have backdoor access to messaging, nothing prevents them from using it to hunt “hate,” “xenophobia,” “terrorism,” “disinformation,” or “autocracy” — all conveniently vague terms. The temptation is already there. “Ursula von der Leyen, in her State of the Union speech, said she only wants to work with pro-Europeans. So everyone with a different vision for Europe is out of bounds,” notes Joron. “The moment you don’t fit the mold, they want to erase you,” she concludes. A scenario straight out of an autocratic regime.

Stay tuned in real time
Subscribe to
the newsletter
By providing your email address you agree to receive the Incyber newsletter and you have read our privacy policy. You can unsubscribe at any time by clicking on the unsubscribe link in all our emails.
Stay tuned in real time
Subscribe to
the newsletter
By providing your email address you agree to receive the Incyber newsletter and you have read our privacy policy. You can unsubscribe at any time by clicking on the unsubscribe link in all our emails.